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Abstract
We consider a routing game among non-atomic agents where link latency functions are conditional on an uncertain
state of the network. All the agents have the same prior belief about the state, but only a fixed fraction receive private
route recommendations. These recommendations are generated by a publicly known signal which maps state to a
probability distribution over route recommendations. The agents who do not receive recommendation choose route
according to Bayes Nash flow with respect to the prior. We develop a computational approach to solve the optimal
information design problem, i.e., to minimize expected social latency cost over all obedient signals. A signal is
obedient if, for every agent, its recommended route is weakly better than other routes with respect to the posterior
induced by the signal. Computing the unique Bayes Nash flow for non-receiving agents under a given signal is
known to be convex. Given flow induced by non-receiving agents, we cast the optimal information design problem
for the receiving agents as an instance of the generalized problem of moments. For affine latency functions, we
exploit the structure of the obedience constraint and the cost function to establish that it is sufficient to consider
one-atomic signals. This implies that there exists an optimal signal whose moment matrix has rank one, and therefore
the information design problem can be solved exactly by a semidefinite program. We provide numerical evidence
to suggest that the natural procedure to alternate between computing Bayes Nash flow for non-receiving agents and
optimal signal for receiving agents, while keeping the other fixed, is globally monotonically convergent.
I. INTRODUCTION
Route choice decision in traffic networks under uncertain and dynamic environments, such as the ones induced
by recurring and unpredictable incidents, can be a daunting task for agents. Route recommendation systems could
therefore play an important role in such settings. While the agents have prior about the uncertain state, e.g., through
experience or publicly available historic records, the informational advantage of such systems in knowing the
realization gives the possibility of inducing a range of traffic flows by selecting different route recommendation
strategies. Such a strategy of a recommendation system to map state realization to (randomized) private route
recommendations for the agents is referred to as a signal. A signal is feasible or obedient, if, to every agent,
it recommends a route which is weakly better in expectation than the other routes. The problem of minimizing
expected social latency cost over all obedient signals is known as information design. In this paper, we are interested
in this problem for non-atomic agents.
The authors are with the University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA. {yixian,ksavla}@usc.edu. This work was supported
in part by NSF CAREER ECCS # 1454729 and CALTRANS # MT-19-06 TO-017.
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2Information design for finite agents has attracted a considerable attention recently with applications in multiple
domains, e.g., see [1] for an overview; the single agent case was studied in [2] as Bayesian persuasion. In finite
agent (and finite action) setting, the obedience condition on the signal can be expressed as finite linear constraints,
one for each combination of actions by the agents. This allows to cast the information design problem as a tractable
optimization problem. Techniques to further reduce computational cost of information design are presented in [3].
However, analogous computational approaches to solve information design for non-atomic agents, particularly for
routing games, are lacking.
There has been a growing interest recently in understanding the impact of information in non-atomic routing
games. For example, [4] demonstrates informational Braess paradox in which revealing information about all the
links does not necessarily minimize social cost; [5], [6] illustrate that properly designed information structure could
reduce price of anarchy; [7] demonstrates that information design only for a fraction of agents, while taking into
account externality from flow induced by the rest, might be beneficial for social cost. Information design using
private signals, as in this paper, has also been pursued recently in [8]. While these existing works provide useful
insights, the information design aspect of these works is restricted to stylized settings involving a network with
just two parallel links, deterministic signals, and link latency functions which ensure non-zero flow on all links
under all state realizations. It is not apparent that the methodologies underlying these studies, which typically rely
on analytical solutions, can be generalized. In this paper, on the other hand, we develop a computational approach
with focus on parallel networks and affine link latency functions, as an illustration.
Our starting point is to recognize that the information design problem is an instance of the generalized problem
of moments (GMP) [9]. A GMP minimizes, over finite probability measures, a cost which is linear in moments
with respect to these measures subject to constraints which are also linear in the moments. This connection allows
to leverage computational tools developed for GMP, which are also applicable to generalizations of, or alternatives
to, the setup considered in this paper. A well-known computational framework is a hierarchy of semidefinite
relaxations to lower bound a GMP arbitrarily closely by relaxation of sufficiently high order, at the expense of
increasing computational cost. By exploring the specific structure of the information design problem in this paper,
we show that it admits a 1-atomic optimal solution. Such a structural insight is useful not only from a practical
perspective, but it also has a significant implication for the cost of computing optimal solution. Specifically, we
use this property to show that the first order semidefinite relaxation is exact, allowing to numerically solve the
information design problem easily using standard GMP solver such as GloptiPoly [10]. This framework can be
extended to the setting, inspired in part by [7], where only a fraction of agents receive recommendations and the
rest choose route according to Bayes Nash flow. We provide numerical evidence to suggest that alternating between
computing optimal signal for the receiving agents and Nash flow for the non-receiving agents, while keeping the
other fixed, leads to global monotone convergence of the social cost to optimal value.
In summary, the main contributions of the paper are as follows. First, by making connection to GMP and
associated semidefinite programming machinery, we point to a compelling computational framework to solve
information design problems. Second, by establishing that optimal signals are 1-atomic, we provide credence to
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3such a structural assumption often implicitly made in information design studies. Third, our proof for the tightness
of the first order semidefinite relaxation for the information design problem relies on a semi definiteness property
of the obedience constraint, suggesting possible generalizations to other constraints. The minor contribution of the
alternating procedure to compute optimal signals when only a fraction of agents receive recommendations allows
to assess the value of information, an exercise which hitherto has been restricted to public signals. Furthermore, the
alternating procedure could possibly be replicated to compute optimal signals in other settings with heterogeneous
agents. Overall, the computational approach proposed in this paper allows to considerably expand the scope of
information design studies for non-atomic routing games, which have been limited so far to stylized settings.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II formulates the information design problem for non-atomic
routing games. Section III shows that the information design problem can be cast as a GMP and that it can be
solved exactly by a SDP. Section IV presents a natural alternating procedure to solve the information design problem
when a fraction of agents do not receive recommendations, and provides numerical evidence for its convergence.
Concluding remarks are provided in Section V. The proofs of all the technical results are provided in the Appendix.
We end this section by defining key notations to be used throughout this paper. Eφ[x] will denote the expected
value of random variable x with respect to probability distribution φ. int(X) will denote the interior of set X and
4(X) the set of all probability distributions on X . For a vector x ∈ Rn, diag(x) will denote the n× n diagonal
matrix with elements of x on the main diagonal. For an integer n, we let [n] := {1, 2, . . . , n}. For a vector x ∈ Rn,
let supp(x) := {i ∈ [n] | xi 6= 0} be the set of indices whose corresponding entries in x are not zero. For λ ≥ 0,
let Pn(λ) :=
{
x ∈ Rn≥0 |
∑
i∈[n] xi = λ
}
be the (n − 1)-dimensional probability simplex of size λ. en,i will be
the standard i-th basis vector in Rn, i.e., its i-th entry is one and all the other entries are zero. 0n×m and 1n×m
will denote n × m matrices all of whose entries are 0 and 1 respectively. In all these notations, the subscripts
corresponding to the size shall be omitted when clear from the context. For a matrix A, its transpose is denoted as
AT . For matrices A and B of the same size, their inner product is A ·B = ∑i,j Ai,jBi,j . A  0 for a symmetric
matrix A will imply that it is positive semidefinite. A principal submatrix of a square matrix A is a submatrix of
A obtained by removing rows and columns from A corresponding to the same set of indices.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND PRELIMINARIES
Consider a network consisting of n parallel links between a single source-destination pair. Without loss of
generality, let the agent population generate a unit volume of traffic demand. The latency functions on the links are
affine in the flow through them, and are conditional on the state of the network ω ∈ Ω:
`ωi (fi) = α
ω
i fi + β
ω
i , i ∈ [n] (1)
We let Ω be a finite set, and let ω ∼ µ0 ∈ int(4(Ω)), for some prior µ0 which is known to all the agents. We
assume that the average value of the linear coefficient in (1) is strictly positive, i.e., αi :=
∑
ω µ0(ω)α
ω
i > 0 for
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4all i ∈ [n].1 Let βi :=
∑
ω µ0(ω)β
ω
i denote the average value of the affine term in (1).
The agents do not have access to the realization of ω, but a fixed fraction ν ∈ [0, 1] of the agents receives private
route recommendations conditional on the realized state. These conditional recommendations are generated by a
signal pi = {piω ∈ 4(Pn(ν)) : ω ∈ Ω} as follows. Given a realization ω ∈ Ω, sample a x ∈ Pn(ν) according to
piω , and partition the agent population into n+1 parts with volumes (x1, . . . , xn, 1−ν). All the agents are identical,
and therefore in the non-atomic setting that we are considering here the partition can be formed by independently
assigning every agent to a partition with probability equal to the volume of that partition. The agents in the (n+1)-
th partition, with volume 1 − ν, do not receive any recommendation, whereas all the agents in the i-th partition,
i ∈ [n], receive recommendation to take route i.
The signal pi and the fraction ν is publicly known to all the agents. Therefore, it is easy to see that the (joint)
posterior on (x, ω), i.e., the proportion of agents getting different recommendations and the state of the network,
formed by an agent who receives recommendation i ∈ [n] is:
µpi,i(x, ω) =
xi piω(x)µ0(ω)∑
θ∈Ω
∫
p∈P(ν) pi piθ(p) dp µ0(θ)
(2)
and the posterior formed by an agent who does not receive a recommendation is:
µ∅(x, ω) = piω(x)µ0(ω) (3)
Remark 1: One could consider an alternate setup where the set of agents who do not participate in the signaling
scheme is pre-determined. These agents do not receive a recommendation and also do not have knowledge about
pi. In this case, (3) can be replaced with µ∅(x, ω) = µ0(ω)|P(ν)| obtained by replacing piω with the uniform distribution.
The methodologies developed in this paper also extend to this alternate setting.
A signal is said to obedient if the recommendation received by every agent is weakly better, in expectation with
respect to posterior in (2), than other routes, while the non-receiving agents induce a Bayes Nash flow with respect
to their posterior in (3). Formally, a pi is said to be obedient if there exists y ∈ Pn(1− ν) such that:∑
ω
∫
x
`i(xi + yi)µ
pi,i(x, ω) dx ≤
∑
ω
∫
x
`j(xj + yj)µ
pi,i(x, ω) dx, i, j ∈ [n]
∑
ω
∫
x
`i(xi + yi)µ
∅(x, ω) dx ≤
∑
ω
∫
x
`j(xj + yj)µ
∅(x, ω) dx, i ∈ supp(y), j ∈ [n]
(4)
Plugging the expressions of beliefs from (2) and (3), and noting that the denominators on both sides of the inequalities
are the same in (4), one gets:∑
ω
∫
x
`i(xi + yi)xi dpiω µ0(ω) ≤
∑
ω
∫
x
`j(xj + yj)xi dpiω µ0(ω), i, j ∈ [n] (5a)
∑
ω
∫
x
`i(xi + yi) dpiω µ0(ω) ≤
∑
ω
∫
x
`j(xj + yj) dpiω µ0(ω), i ∈ supp(y), j ∈ [n] (5b)
1Throughout the paper, unless noted otherwise, the summation over indices for state and link, such as ω and i, respectively, are to be taken
over the entire range, i.e., Ω and [n], respectively.
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5The information design problem can then be stated as minimizing the expected total latency:
J(pi, y) :=
∑
ω, i
∫
(xi + yi) `i(xi + yi) dpiω µ0(ω) (6)
over all (pi, y) ∈ Π× P(1− ν) subject to (5), where Π is the concise notation for 4(P(ν))|Ω|.
Remark 2: The revelation principle, e.g., see [1], implies that optimality in the class of obedient direct private
signals, i.e., signals which recommend routes, also ensures optimality within a broader class which includes indirect
signals. An indirect signal provides noisy information about the state realization. The route choice is then determined
by Bayes Nash flow with respect to the posterior beliefs induced by the signal.
Computing solution to the information design problem is challenging, not the least because it involves optimizing
over probability distributions. The next section develops a computationally tractable approach to minimize J(pi, y)
with respect to pi or y, while keeping the other fixed. This will then lead to a natural alternating procedure in
Section IV. For illustration purpose, we focus on affine latency functions of the form (1).
III. A SEMIDEFINITE APPROACH
For a given pi ∈ Π, there exists a unique y ∈ P(1 − ν) satisfying (5b), and therefore minimizing J(pi, y) with
respect to y for a fixed pi is trivial.
Lemma 1: For every pi ∈ Π, there exists a unique y ∈ P(1− ν) satisfying (5b). Such a y is the unique solution
to the following convex problem:
min
y∈P(1−ν)
∑
i
αi
y2i
2
+
(∑
ω
µ0(ω)α
ω
i Epiω [xi] + βi
)
yi
Lemma 1 follows from a straightforward adaptation of the standard argument for Wardrop equilibrium in the
deterministic case. A short proof is provided in Section A for the sake of completeness.
We now turn our attention to minimizing J(pi, y) over pi satisfying (5a), for a fixed y. Note that, for y = 0, this
corresponds to the information design problem in the special case when ν = 1. Even in this special case, which
has been studied previously in [6], [8], no comprehensive solution methodology exists.
We start by rewriting the information design problem in terms of moments of the signal pi. Let z = [1, x1, . . . , xn]T ,
and
Z =
1 xT
x xxT

The information design problem for a fixed y can then be written as:
min
pi∈Π
∑
ω
∫
Cω(y) · Z dpiω (7a)
s.t.
∑
ω
∫
A(i,j)ω (y) · Z dpiω ≥ 0, i, j ∈ [n] (7b)
where Cω and A
(i,j)
ω are appropriate symmetric matrices whose expressions are provided in Section B. The cost in
(7a) is the same as the cost in (6), and (7b) corresponds to the obedience constraint in (5a).
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6In order to state the next result, we describe an important sub-class of Π. A signal pi ∈ Π is said to be 1-atomic
if, for every ω ∈ Ω, piω(x) = δ(x− xˆω) for some xˆω ∈ P(ν). 2
Theorem 1: For every y ∈ P(1− ν), there exists an optimal solution pi∗ to (7) which is 1-atomic.
Remark 3: 1) The proof (in Section C) implies that Theorem 1 can be extended to any Cω , ω ∈ Ω, and any
finite constraints of the form
∑
ω Aω ·Mω ≥ 0, if, for all ω, the principal submatrices of Cω and Aω obtained
by removing the first row and first column are, respectively, positive semidefinite and negative semidefinite.
2) Theorem 1 and its proof approach might appear to be generalization of an observation in [8], which was made
in the context of n = 2 and under constraints on the coefficients in the affine form of the link latency functions.
However, not only do we remove these restrictions, but more importantly, our proof implicitly highlights that
the obedience constraint needs more careful treatment than suggested in [8].
Theorem 1 implies that the following constrained version of (7) also solves the information design problem, for
a given y:
min
pi∈Π
∑
ω
∫
Cω(y) · Z dpiω s.t. (7b) and piω is 1-atomic for all ω ∈ Ω (8)
Remark 4: The constrained version in (8) has been used for optimal information design in previous studies,
including [5], [6]. However, to the best of our knowledge, no formal proof has been provided for its equivalence
to (7).
(7) is an instance of the generalized problem of moments (GMP) [9]. Therefore, Theorem 1 implies that one
can solve the information design problem for a fixed y by casting it as a GMP, which in turn can be solved
numerically using GloptiPoly [10]. This software solves GMP by lower bounding it with semidefinite relaxations
of increasing order. However, the stopping criterion on the order is user-defined and problem-dependent. We
now develop a semidefinite program which solves (7), and hence (8), exactly. Towards that purpose, consider
the following:
min
M:={Mω:ω∈Ω}
Jˆ(M) :=
∑
ω
Cω(y) ·Mω (9a)
s.t.
∑
ω
A(i,j)ω (y) ·Mω ≥ 0, i, j ∈ [n] (9b)
Mω  0, ω ∈ Ω (9c)
Mω(1, 1) = 1, ω ∈ Ω (9d)
Mω(i, j) ≥ 0, i, j ∈ [n+ 1], ω ∈ Ω (9e)
S ·Mω = 0, ω ∈ Ω (9f)
T (i) ·Mω = 0, i ∈ [n], ω ∈ Ω (9g)
rank(Mω) = 1, ω ∈ Ω (9h)
2δ(t) denotes the Dirac delta function, i.e., δ(0) = 1 and δ(t) = 0 if t 6= 0.
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7where the expressions for symmetric matrices S and T (i) are provided in Section B. The next result states the
equivalence between (8) and (9), as well as that solving (9) is equivalent to solving the following SDP obtained by
relaxing the rank condition in (9h):
min
M
Jˆ(M) s.t. (9b)− (9g) (10)
In preparation for the result, let
M(piω) :=
∫
Z dpiω =
 1 ∫ xT dpiω∫
xdpiω
∫
xxT dpiω
 (11)
be the second order moment matrix corresponding to piω .
Proposition 1: (i) For every pi feasible for (8), and hence also for (7), M(pi) := {M(piω) : ω ∈ Ω} defined in
(11) is feasible for (9), and hence also for (10). Furthermore, Jˆ(M(pi)) = J(pi);
(ii) For every M =
Mω =
 1 mTω
mω mωm
T
ω
 : ω ∈ Ω
 feasible for (9), pi = {piω = δ(x − mω) : ω ∈ Ω} is
feasible for (8) and Jˆ(M) = J(pi);
(iii) There exists an optimal solution M∗ for (10) such that rank(M∗ω) = 1 for all ω ∈ Ω.
Proposition 1 implies that the optimal values of (7), (8), (9), and (10) are all equal to each other. The next result
gives a relationship between the optimizers.
Theorem 2: If
M∗ω =
 1 m∗ωT
m∗ω M
0,∗
ω
 , ω ∈ Ω (12)
is an optimal solution for (10), then
pi∗ω(x) = δ(x−m∗ω), ω ∈ Ω (13)
is an optimal solution for (8), and hence also for (7).
Remark 5: 1) Along the lines of the proof of Proposition 1(i), it is easy to see that for a pi feasible for (7),
M(pi) in (11) is feasible for (10), and therefore (10) gives a lower bound to (7). This relationship can be
extended to any Cω , ω ∈ Ω, and even if the obedience condition is replaced with any linear constraint on
moments up to degree two, i.e., even if (7b) is replaced with finite constraints of the form
∑
ω Aω ·Mω ≥ 0
for any Aω , ω ∈ Ω. On the other hand, the equivalence between (7) and (10), as implied by Theorem 2,
can be extended to Cω and Aω whose submatrices obtained by removing the first row and first column are,
respectively, positive semidefinite and negative semidefinite.
2) Theorem 2 implies that (7) can be solved numerically using GloptiPoly directly by choosing (minimum
default) order equal to one.
IV. SIMULATIONS
The discussion in the previous section suggests the following natural alternating procedure for solving the optimal
information design problem. Pick an initial y(0) ∈ P(1 − ν), e.g., uniformly at random, and starting with k = 0,
execute the following repeatedly until convergence:
May 7, 2020 DRAFT
8(i) Solve (7) for fixed y(k) to obtain pi(k+1)
(ii) Solve (1) for fixed pi(k+1) to obtain y(k+1)
(iii) k ← k + 1
Figure 1 shows the minimum social cost for different ν ∈ [0, 1], computed by the alternating procedure, for the
following parameters:
α =

i=1 i=2
ω1 1 10
ω2 10 2
, β =

i=1 i=2
ω1 2 1
ω2 2 1
, µ0 =
ω1 0.5
ω2 0.5

For each ν, we computed the asymptotic cost for 100 different initializations of y all chosen uniformly at random
from P(1−ν). For each initialization, we observed that the cost converged monotonically in an increasing manner,
and that the asymptotic cost was the same for each initialization. Theoretical guarantees to support these observations
are in progress.
0 0.5 1
2
4
6
8
10
co
st
Fig. 1: Optimal social cost for different ν
Signals corresponding to optimal costs for a few sample ν are:
pi(ν = 0.25) =

i=1 i=2
ω1 1 0
ω2 0 1
, pi(ν = 0.5) =

i=1 i=2
ω1 1 0
ω2 0 1

pi(ν = 0.75) =

i=1 i=2
ω1 1 0
ω2 0.17 0.83
, pi(ν = 1.0) =

i=1 i=2
ω1 0.81 0.19
ω2 0.12 0.88

The ratio 8.89/2.82 = 3.15 between the optimal costs for ν = 0 and ν = 1 illustrates the potential of optimal
information design to reduce social congestion cost.
May 7, 2020 DRAFT
9V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Information design for non-atomic routing games is gaining increasing attention. While existing works provide
useful insights through analysis of simple scenarios, the generality of these insights is not readily apparent. Relatedly,
a computational approach to operationalize optimal information design for general settings does not exist to the
best of our knowledge. By making connection to semidefinite programming (SDP), this paper not only fills this
gap, but also allows to leverage computational tools developed by the SDP community. The latter is particularly
relevant for extending the approach to general non-atomic games.
There are several immediate directions for future work. The observations in Section IV point to an interesting
conjecture on the convergence properties of the alternating procedure. Extension to higher order polynomial latency
functions is natural to pursue. One such practically relevant instance is the BPR latency function [11]. It would
also be interesting to extend the framework to other constraints on feasible signals. One such constraint that has
attracted attention recently is that of public signals, e.g., see [7], [12]. Finally, it would be interesting to utilize the
approach in this paper to quantify the reduction in price of anarchy under information design. This will complement
preliminary work, e.g., in [5], where such an analysis is provided under specific models for correlation between
coefficients of affine latency functions across links, and under a specific class of signals.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 1
Strict convexity of (1) follows from the assumption that αi > 0 for all i ∈ [n]. Combining this with convexity
of P(1 − ν) implies that (1) admits a unique solution. The KKT condition, which is necessary and sufficient in
this case, states that y ∈ P(1 − ν) is a solution if there exist ηi ≥ 0 and γ ∈ R such that, for all i ∈ [n],∑
ω µ0(ω)Epiω [αωi (xi + yi) + βωi ] − ηi + γ = 0 and ηiyi = 0. Equivalence between this and (5b) then follows
standard arguments for Wardrop equilibrium.
B. Matrix Expressions
In all the matrices below, the lower triangular entries, generically represented as *, are equal to their upper
triangular counterparts.
Cω(y) = µ0(ω)
yTdiag(αω)y + yTβω βωT2 + yTdiag(αω)
∗ diag(αω)
 , αω = [αω1 , . . . , αωn ]T , βω = [βω1 , . . . , βωn ]T
(14)
A(i,j)ω (y) = µ0(ω)
0 αωj yj−αωi yi+βωj −βωi2 eTi
∗ A˜(i,j)ω + A˜(i,j)ω
T
 , A˜(i,j)ω = αωj2 eieTj − αωi2 eieTi (15)
S =
−ν 1T2
∗ 0
 , T (i) =
0 −ν2 eTi
∗ 1eTi +ei1T2
 (16)
C. Proof of Theorem 1
We prove the existence of a 1-atomic optimal solution by showing that for every feasible pi, the 1-atomic
{piatω(x) = δ(x− Epiω (x)) : ω ∈ Ω} is feasible and satisfies J(piat) ≤ J(pi).
Recalling the definition of M(piω) from (11), the obedience condition (7b) for pi can be rewritten as, for all
i, j ∈ [n],
0 ≤
∑
ω
A(i,j)ω ·M(piω) =
∑
ω
µ0(ω)
(
A˜(i,j)ω + A˜
(i,j)
ω
T
)
·M0(piω) +
∑
ω
µ0(ω)(α
ω
j yj − αωi yi + βωkj − βωki )Epiω [xi]
(17)
where M0(piω) is the principal submatrix of M(piω) obtained by removing first row and first column. It is easy to
see that M0(piatω)−M0(piω) is the negative of the covariance matrix of piω , and is therefore negative semidefinite. It
is also easy to see from (15) that A˜(i,j)ω + A˜
(i,j)
ω
T
is negative semidefinite. Since the inner product of two negative
semidefinite matrices is nonnegative,
(
A˜
(i,j)
ω + A˜
(i,j)
ω
T
)
· (M0(piatω) − M0(pi)) ≥ 0. Adding this to (17) gives∑
ω µ0(ω)
(
A˜
(i,j)
ω + A˜
(i,j)
ω
T
)
·M0(piatω) +
∑
ω µ0(ω)(α
ω
j yj − αωi yi + βωkj − βωki )Epiatω [xi] ≥ 0, where we recall
that Epiω [x] = Epiatω [x] by definition of pi
at
ω . Therefore, pi
at also satisfies (7b). Along similar lines, J(pi)− J(piat) =∑
ω µ0(ω)diag(α
ω) · (M0(piω)−M0(piatω)) ≥ 0, where the inequality follows from diag(αω)  0.
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D. Technical Results
Lemma 2: Consider a m×m real symmetric matrix X with rank k. X is positive semidefinite if and only if it
has a positive semidefinite principal submatrix of rank k.
Proof: The necessary condition is obvious.
Without loss of generality, let the principal submatrix, say X˜ , of rank k be the leading one of order k. The
leading principal submatrix of order k + 1 is singular since its rank is k. Its leading principal minors are also
leading principal minors of X˜ , and therefore nonnegative. This implies that the leading principal submatrix of order
k + 1 is positive semidefinite. Induction then establishes the sufficient condition.
We need additional definitions for the next result. These are taken from [13]. A truncated moment sequence
(tms) in n variables and of degree d is a finite sequence s = (sa) indexed by nonnegative integer vectors a :=
(a1, . . . , an) ∈ Nn with |a| := a1 + . . .+an ≤ d. Given a set K, a tms s is said to admit a K- probability measure
ζ, i.e., a nonnegative Borel measure supported in K with
∫
K
dζ = 1, if
sa =
∫
K
xa dζ, ∀ a ∈ Nn : |a| ≤ d
where xa = xa11 . . . x
an
n for x = (x1, . . . , xn) and a = (a1, . . . , an).
We are interested in tms of degree 2. Accordingly, for brevity in notation, let
si := s(0,...,0, 1︸︷︷︸
i
,0,...,0), si,j := t(0,...,0, 1︸︷︷︸
i
,0,...,0, 1︸︷︷︸
j
,0,...,0), i, j ∈ [n] (18)
Proposition 2: If a tms s in n variables and of degree 2 satisfies:
M(s) :=

1 s1 . . . sn
s1 s1,1 . . . s1,n
...
... . . .
...
sn sn,1 . . . sn,n
  0; si ≥ 0, i ∈ [n]; si,j ≥ 0, i, j ∈ [n]
∑
i∈[n]
si = ν;
∑
j∈[n]
si,j = νsi, i ∈ [n]
(19a)
rank(M(s)) = 1 (19b)
then it admits a unique Pn(ν)-probability measure, which is also 1-atomic and given by ζ(x) = δ(x−[s1, . . . , sn]T ).
Proof: (19b) implies that
si,j = si sj , i, j ∈ [n] (20)
[13, Theorem 1.1], which in turn is from [14], implies that a s satisfying (19a) admits a unique Pn(ν)- probability
measure if there exists a tms w in n variables and of degree 4 such that it satisfies wa = sa for all |a| ≤ 2, and
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the following:
M(w) :=

1 w1 . . . wn w1,1 . . . w1,n . . . wn,1 . . . wn,n
w1 w1,1 . . . w1,n w1,1,1 . . . w1,1,n . . . w1,n,1 . . . w1,n,n
...
... . . .
...
... . . .
... . . .
... . . .
...
wn wn,1 . . . wn,n wn,1,1 . . . wn,1,n . . . wn,n,1 . . . wn,n,n
w1,1 w1,1,1 . . . w1,1,n w1,1,1,1 . . . w1,1,1,n . . . w1,1,n,1 . . . w1,1,n,n
...
... . . .
...
... . . .
... . . .
... . . .
...
w1,n w1,n,1 . . . w1,n,n w1,n,1,1 . . . w1,n,1,n . . . w1,n,n,1 . . . w1,n,n,n
...
... . . .
...
... . . .
... . . .
... . . .
...
wn,1 wn,1,1 . . . wn,1,n wn,1,1,1 . . . wn,1,1,n . . . wn,1,n,1 . . . wn,1,n,n
...
... . . .
...
... . . .
... . . .
... . . .
...
wn,n wn,n,1 . . . wn,n,n wn,n,1,1 . . . wn,n,1,n . . . wn,n,n,1 . . . wn,n,n,n

 0
Mi(w) :=

wi wi,1 . . . wi,n
wi,1 wi,1,1 . . . wi,1,n
...
... . . .
...
wi,n wi,n,1 . . . wi,n,n
  0, i ∈ [n];
∑
k∈[n]
wi,j,k = ν wi,j , i, j ∈ [n]
(21)
where wi, wi,j , wi,j,k, and wi,j,k,l are defined similar to (18). Let
wi,j,k = sisjsk, wi,j,k,l = sisjsksl, i, j, k, l ∈ [n] (22)
(20) and (22) imply wi,j,k = si,jsk = wi,jsk, and therefore,
∑
k∈[n] wi,j,k = wi,j
∑
k sk = νwi,j . (22) implies that
every column of Mi(w) is a multiple of the first column, and therefore rank(Mi(w)) = 1. Since the leading entry
wi is nonnegative, Lemma 2 implies that Mi(w) is positive semidefinite. Along the same lines, M(w) has rank
one and is positive semidefinite.
Since rank(M(w)) = 1 = rank(M(s)), [13, Theorem 1.1] implies that the unique probability measure ζ is
1-atomic. The expression for ζ is then trivial from the fact that Eζ [x] = [s1, . . . , sn]T .
E. Proof of Proposition 1
(i) For a 1-atomic pi, (11) becomes M(piω) =
 1 ∫ xT dpiω∫
xdpiω
∫
xdpiω
∫
xTdpiω
 implying that Mω is rank one and
positive semidefinite. M(pi) satisfying (9b) follows readily from (7b). Similarly, equality of the costs in (9a)
and (7a) is also straightforward. (9d) follows from the definition of M(pi), and (9e)-(9g) follow from the fact
that the support of piω is P(ν).
(ii) Proposition 2 implies that the 1-atomic pi = {piω = δ(x−mω) : ω ∈ Ω} belongs to Π. Simple algebra shows
the equivalence between the obedience constraints in (7b) and (9b), and the costs in (7a) and (9a).
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(iii) It is easy to see that a feasible solution to (9) is of the form
M˜ :=
M˜ω =
 1 mTω
mω mωm
T
ω
 : ω ∈ Ω
 (23)
The existence of a rank one optimal solution to (10) is proven by showing that, for everyM =
Mω =
 1 mTω
mω M
0
ω
 : ω ∈ Ω

feasible for (10), the rank one M˜ in (23) is also feasible and satisfies Jˆ(M) ≥ Jˆ(M˜).
The proof for M˜ satisfying (9b) follows along the same lines as the proof of Theorem 1. Feasibility of (9c)-(9e)
follows from the definition of M˜. It is easy to see that S · M˜ω = S ·Mω and therefore (9f) is also satisfied.
(16) implies, for all i ∈ [n],
T (i) · M˜ω = −νmω,i + (1eTi ) · (mωmωT ) = −νmω,i +
∑
j
mω,imω,j = −νmω,i + νmω,i = 0
implying M˜ satisfies (9g). Along the same lines as in the proof of Theorem 1, Jˆ(M) − Jˆ(M˜) = ∑ω C0ω ·
(M0ω −mωmTω ) ≥ 0, where the inequality follows from Mω =
 1 mTω
mω M
0
ω
  0.
F. Proof of Theorem 2
The proof of Proposition 1(iii) implies that without loss of generality one can assume M0,∗ω = m
∗
ωm
∗
ω
T in (12),
and hence that M∗ω is rank one. Proposition 1(ii) then implies that pi
∗ in (13) is optimal for (8), and hence also for
(7).
May 7, 2020 DRAFT
